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Herman Knudsen & Jens Lind 
Aalborg University 
 
Is the cow still sacred? Danish Trade Unions and European 
Integration 
 
Introduction 
The aim of this paper is to describe and explain how Danish trade unions have reacted to European 
integration since 1973 when Denmark joined the European Union (EU). The authors have earlier 
conceptualised the orientation of Danish unions towards the European scene as rather foot-dragging 
and building on the defence of „the Danish model‟, a model that has been cherished and guarded as 
a sacred cow (Lind and Knudsen, 2001). In this paper we ask if this is still the case after the changes 
that have taken place at the European as well as the Danish scene during the last decade. 
 
The paper has two main parts. In the first part we identify and describe the central features of 
Danish trade unionism and the Danish industrial relations system („the Danish model‟). In the 
second part we address the attitudes and policies pursued by Danish unions during the different 
phases of the European integration process. 
 
Part I: Main features of Danish industrial relations and trade unionism 
 
Industrial relations 
The Danish industrial relations system displays a mixture of voluntarist and corporatist features. It 
is voluntarist in the sense that the central rules are decided by the trade union and employer 
organisations themselves. The so-called Main Agreement (Hovedaftalen) functions as the industrial 
relations constitution. It has its origin in the outcome of a long and bitter conflict between 
employers and workers in 1899. It lays down that employer organisation recognize trade unions as 
legitimate representatives of workers, with a right to collective bargaining, whereas unions 
recognize the employers‟ right to manage. Further provisions regulate the right to strike which is 
limited by a peace obligation as long as collective agreements are in force, and local representation 
of worker interests through shop stewards (trade union delegates at the individual workplaces). 
According to other central agreements, Co-operation Agreements (samarbejdsaftaler), local union 
representatives are entitled to be informed and consulted by employers regularly. These features add 
up to what may be termed centralised voluntarism where many issues are settled by the parties 
themselves, but within centrally agreed frames. 
 
At the same time the Danish IR system has strong corporatist elements and as such can be grouped 
as a member of a wider Nordic corporatism (Schiller et al 2003). In Denmark, the state basically 
functions as a facilitator towards the IR parties through institutions such as the labour court and an 
arbitration council, but also through relatively generous expenditure on vocational training, active 
employment policies, an early retirement scheme etc, and thereby reduces the potential for conflict 
between the parties. Government and parliament generally abstain from intervening in central IR 
issues such as pay and working time, thus respecting the autonomy of the parties. Furthermore, 
strong corporatist structures are in place in relation to for instance employment policy, vocational 
training, and health and safety. For their part, the trade unions are eager to show that they  respect 
the political system and its macro-economic goals. Since 1987 the Danish LO 
(Landsorganisationen i Danmark) has explicitly supported an anti-inflationary policy by 
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moderating pay claims to a level  thought to be conducive to the competitiveness of the Danish 
economy. The Danish unions try to balance a strong involvement in national concertation, and 
concessions in that respect, with acts that demonstrate their independent power. The latter may for 
instance be strike action against employers who are unwilling to sign a collective agreement, or it 
may be refusal to enter into concession bargaining on higher working time or lower pay. Actually, 
the level of conflict – measured in working days lost due to industrial action – is relatively high in 
Denmark (Stokke and Thörnqvist 2001). Thus, although the IR system is characterised by a high 
degree of co-operation and partnership  conflicts have not withered away. 
 
There have been no great ruptures in the Danish IR system since the first main agreement in 1899. 
Rather, it has developed in an evolutionary way, with new institutions being added on over the 
years and spreading to sectors outside its original core, craft and manufacturing industry. For 
instance, in the decades after  the Second World War the public sector developed institutions such 
as collective bargaining and shop stewards similar to those in the private sector.  
 
Since the early 1980s collective bargaining has been decentralised, partly away from the influence 
of the peak organisations and partly down to establishment level, and since the mid-1990s the 
duration of collective agreements have become longer (typically from two to three years) and less 
synchronised as they are not all bargained the same year. Central collective agreements are  
bargained at national-sector level. However, there is a tendency for the agreements in the various 
industries to differ more and more, and the national agreements increasingly include opening 
clauses and general rights which, in order to be applied, have to be bargained further at the 
individual company or workplace. Such framework agreements allow for more local flexibility 
which again open up for an individualised and diversified outcome – to the benefit of workers if 
local conditions are in their favour, and to the opposite if the company is in trouble and 
unemployment is high in the area. . 
 
In recent years collective bargaining has expanded in scope. From 1994 to 2000 the coverage of 
collective agreements in the private sector increased from around 50 per cent to 60 of the workforce 
(Scheuer and Madsen 2000) and total coverage (including the public sector) from around 70 to 75 
per cent. As legislation on key areas is sparse – there is no legislation on pay and very little 
legislation on working time – this means that 25 per cent of all employed, and up to 40 per cent of 
those employed in the private sector, are lacking not just the rights and security granted by a 
collective agreement, but also certain statutory rights that in other European countries are part of 
labour legislation.  
 
 
 
Trade union structure and membership 
The Danish union structure has evolved as a mix of different principles of organisation. The first 
unions - organising for instance carpenters, joiners and blacksmiths - grew out of the guild system 
and were based on craft. From the late 19
th
 century unskilled workers also formed unions; 
especially two became important, namely the general union for unskilled men and the similar one 
for unskilled women. Higher educated groups such as teachers and engineers formed professional 
associations which during the 20
th
 century more and more took on the character of unions. Finally, 
there have been attempts to organise along industry lines, one result being a union for skilled as 
well as unskilled workers in the food industry, another – and more recent – the merger of former 
craft unions into a union for the wood and building industry. In particular within the last two 
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decades a number of important mergers have taken place, the most important being the one in 2002 
when the two general unions merged into 3F (Fagligt FællesForbund) which is now Denmark‟s 
largest union. 
 
There are three union peak organisations or confederations. The largest and most important one is 
the LO (the confederation associating the unions of skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled workers). 
The other confederations are the FTF (salaried employees, including teachers, police personnel and 
employees in the finance sector) and the AC (employees with a university or similar education). As 
the three confederations organise different segments of the labour force, which can be identified in a 
relatively objective way, they only marginally compete with each other over members. Together,  
theunions affiliated to the three confederations form what can be called Danish ‟mainstream 
unionism‟. The LO traditionally was part of the social-democratic labour movement and was 
institutionally linked to the party, but since the late 1990s the formal links have been cut. The FTF 
and AC have attempted to maintain a politically ‟neutral‟ position. On issues such as labour 
legislation and labour market policy the three organisations work relatively closely together. 
Outside the mainstream unions there are a small number of alternative unions, the oldest one being 
the Christian Union. These unions mainly attract members by means of low membership fees and 
are for this reason sometimes labelled ‟discount unions‟. Although they have been growing during 
the past few years (Lind 2009), their importance is still negligible, not least because they are hardly 
party to any collective agreements.  
 
For collective bargaining purposes at national sector level neither the individual unions nor the 
confederations play the central role. This is a consequence of the mixed union structure as well as 
pressure from the employer side to reduce the number of national agreements. Given the absence of 
a union structure defined along industry lines the important sector collective agreements are 
negotiated between cartels of unions and the sector organisation on the employer side. The cartel 
negotiating the agreement for manufacturing industry, for instance, includes representatives from 
several craft based unions, such as those of the metalworkers and the electricians, as well as from 
3F, the large general union. .  
 
A peculiarity in the private sector is that only the unions of „blue collar‟ workers take part in 
negotiations and are covered by the sector agreement. The union of office workers, although 
affiliated to the LO, is excluded and have to negotiate its own agreement. The union can only do so 
for workplaces in which at least 50 per cent of office employees are union members. This reflects a 
historical attempt on the part of the Danish Employers‟ Confederation (DA, Dansk 
Arbejdsgiverforening) to give this group of employees the status of „functionaries‟ and to avoid 
unionism among them. Not only office workers, but also technical and academic staff, who, if 
organised, are typically members of unions affiliated to the FTF or AC, are outside the sectoral 
collective agreement, and the employer organisations have never accepted to negotiate collective 
agreements at the national level with the unions representing these groups of employees. Only at 
establishment level has for example the union of engineers in some instances been able to achieve a 
collective agreement. These limitations in the scope of collective bargaining in the private sector 
help explain why in Denmark, quite atypically, collective bargaining coverage is actually lower 
than trade union membership.  
 
Another atypical feature of Danish unionism, although not in a Nordic context, is that trade union 
affiliation is high and actually managed to increase considerably from the 1970s until the mid-
1990s. When the Golden Age of social democracy and trade unionism (Standing 1999) faded in 
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Europe during the 1970s with the subsequent collapse of Keynesianism and rising unemployment 
the trade unions in Denmark were still getting stronger. During the 1970s  the trade union 
membership rate increased by  more than 25 per cent, but the past 15 years of membership decline 
has especially affected the unions affiliated to the LO while member unions of the FTF and the AC 
together with unions outside the main organisations actually have gained members.  
  
Table 1. Members of trade unions in Denmark (000) 
 
 1970 1980 1990 1995 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 
Labour force* 2027 2384 2669 2648 2639 2659 2672 2656 2667 2723 2718~ 
LO 894  1250  1423  1510  1484  1459  1433  1386  1339 1251 1201 
FTF 156  277  325  332  344  350  356  359  363  359 358 
AC - 70  103  132  143  150  161  165  166  
 
174 186** 
Outside LO, FTF, AC 111  197  201  189 195  202  201  217  246 278 305 
All trade unions 1162 1794 2051 2163 2166 2161 2151 2127 2114 2062 2050 
Per cent of labour force 57 75 77 81 82 81 81 80 79 76 75 
 
Remarks: *self-employed not included, ** incl. engineers, ~ estimated. Note: Danmarks Frie Fagforeninger (The Free 
Trade Union in Denmark) not included. 
Source: Danmarks Statistik 
 
The confederations‟ share of total membership (per cent) 
 
 1970 1980 1990 1995 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 
LO 77 70 69 70 69 68 66 65 63 61 59 
FTF 13 15 16 15 16 16 17 17 17 17 17 
AC - 4 5 6 7 7 7 8 8 8 9 
Outside LO, FTF, AC 10 11 10 9 9 9 9 10 11 13 15 
 
Source: Own calculations 
 
A man reason for the LO membership loses is the industrial and occupational change that has taken 
place. It is the FTF and AC unions that organise the well educated parts of the labour force that are 
on the increase these years. Another important reason for declining membership of the LO unions is 
the special sort of unemployment insurance system, the Ghent-system, that can be found in 
Denmark (and Finland and Sweden). When people join the unemployment insurance they also join 
the trade unions that are connected to insurance and if they do not join the unemployment insurance 
they may also abstain from union membership. Since the mid-1990s fewer people took 
unemployment insurance because of declining unemployment rates (from 12 per cent of the work 
force in 1996 to 2 per cent in 2008) and because the unemployment insurance was made less 
attractive for instance by reducing the compensation rate and introducing stricter rules for being 
eligible to unemployment benefits. In addition the liberal-conservative government in 2002 losened 
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the bonds between the unemployment insurance and the unions which furthermore resulted in 
membership gains for the trade unions outside the main organisations (Lind 2009). 
 
Some political interventions by the right-wing Government in power since 2001 also seem to play a 
role for membership decline. The Government, however, was not immediately successful with its 
plans of banning closed shops, but in 2006 the European Court ruled closed shops illegal and 
subsequent Danish legislation followed up. About 200,000 workers had been covered by closed 
shop agreements. The ban on closed shops did not lead to any significant loss of membership in 
itself, but symbolically it strengthened the liberalist view that people are free to choose – which 
union to join and whether or not to join a union at all. 
 
 
Trade unions at workplace level 
Traditionally, employee representation in the Danish system of industrial relations takes place 
through a single channel, namely  the unions. Trade unions not only conduct collective bargaining 
at sectoral level, but also have an almost complete representation monopoly at workplace level. 
Here local trade union delegates, or shop stewards, are involved in local bargaining, monitoring the 
observance of collective agreements and other rules, and protecting the rights and interests of 
individual employees. At the same time, employee representatives are entitled to participate in 
management decisions, partly as representatives on the company board, and partly as members of 
the co-operation committee, which is the Danish equivalent of a works council. The representation 
at board level formally deviates from the single channel model as the law requires representatives to 
be elected by all employees irrespective of trade union membership. However, in practice the great 
majority of employee representatives on boards are trade unionists and even shop stewards. 
 
 Unlike in Germany, the Danish works councils are not based on legislation. The co-operation 
committees owe their existence to national collective agreements between peak level trade union 
and employer organisations. In the private sector the by far most important agreement is the one – 
in force since 1947 - between the LO and the DA. Other co-operation agreements cover the agro-
industrial and the finance sector, while in the public sector there are agreements for the state and for 
local government respectively. 
 
The co-operation agreement lays down principles, which are designed to guide the co-operation 
between management and labour in the establishment. Seen from an employee perspective it entails 
the right to be informed and consulted on a number of workplace issues, and the agreement  
determines that a dialogue must take place concerning employment and working conditions with the 
aim of reaching agreement between the parties as to which principles shall apply for instance 
regarding training, recruitment, technological change and similar issues (Knudsen 1995, 82-90). 
 
Similar to the French comité d‟entreprise, the Danish co-operation committee is a joint body 
consisting of, on the one side management representatives, on the other shop stewards representing 
the members of the different trade unions present at the establishment.   
 
It is important to note that although the Danish system is fundamentally a single channel system the 
shop stewards play a dual role within it. On the one hand, shop stewards are the local union 
representatives dealing with hardcore collective bargaining issues such as pay and working time. On 
the other hand, they also – in a different forum: the co-operation committee – discuss more soft and 
qualitative issues with management and thus to some extent participate in workplace decision-
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making with management. There is no doubt that historically the former role has been considered 
the most important. This role deals with the bread and butter issues, and as collective bargaining is 
linked with the right to strike, shop stewards have a clear sense of power within this field. The latter 
role – the one connected with participation through the co-operation committee – is more concerned 
with HRM issues. However, in recent years the participatory role has become increasingly 
important as managers often want to involve, and commit, co-operation committees in strategic 
decision-making..  
 
Trade Union Policies 
Danish trade unions are pragmatic and cooperative. They  see themselves as responsible actors in a 
well regulated society where improvements in living standards and working conditions are the 
result of a stable and incremental development (Lind 1996). The unions see their main tasks as 
securing a fair distribution of the wealth in society and establishing a high level of social security. 
Danish unions have stepped down from demands for major structural reforms – they abandoned 
their demand for economic democracy in the late 1980s – and have accommodated to the neo-
liberal policies which have dominated the world since the 1980s. Together with employers and the 
Government the unions have cherished the benefits of „flexicurity‟, although lately certain union 
spokesmen have lamented that the security part is slowly and steadily being eroded. 
 
Danish unions have basically accepted the conditions that have been termed globalisation. Instead 
of fighting open markets and job losses in Denmark their strategy has been to take part in changes 
that can improve the competitiveness of the Danish economy, first and foremost by fighting for 
better training and a permanent upgrading of skills in the labour force. This strategy means that the 
unions have accepted moderate wage claims to keep the national economy competitive and  have 
accepted to be an active partner in the quest for productivity increases. This helps explain why 
Danish unions were to be found on the sideline in 2011 when the ETUC campaigned against the 
Euro Pact (see below). 
 
. From the mid-1990s stable economic growth  secured both increasing employment and real wage 
increases while unions at the same time, in a number of respects, allowed more flexibility in the 
deployment of labour. The financial crisis beginning in 2008 led to rising unemployment and falling 
real wages. However, so far (2011) Danish trade unions have not made any substantial changes to 
their rather pro-market policies. This in spite of the fact that the liberal-conservative government in 
power since 2001 has introduced a number of initiatives that affect union members negatively. For 
instance, in 2009 the period members of the unemployment insurance funds can receive 
unemployment benefit was reduced from four to two years, and in 2011 the early retirement scheme 
was changed in a way which will make it much less favourable to workers. 
 
 
 
Part II: Danish Unions and European Integration 
 
Unions divided over Danish EEC entry in 1973  
Denmark became a member of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1973 together with 
Britain and Ireland. The main motive for joining was financial; more precisely it was seen as central 
that Danish export goods, notably bacon and other agricultural products, could continue to have free 
access to the British market. 
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In the debate prior to the referendum in 1972, which endorsed Danish EEC membership, the 
opponents on the left conceptualised the EEC as ‟capital‟s Europe‟. They argued that joining the 
EEC was only the first step towards entering something that would become ”an ever closer union”  
- as actually stated as the aim in the Treaty of Rome - and that such a future would mean increased 
immigration threatening the employment of Danish workers and endanger labour standards and the 
autonomy of the Danish industrial relations system. The proponents, for their part, eagerly stressed 
the expected financial benefits of EEC membership and denied that political and social integration 
would ever become realistic features of the Community; consequently, industrial relations and 
labour standards would not be affected. Although the LO presidency campaigned for Danish entry 
many trade union leaders were opposed. Among the rank-and-file opinions were also divided, but as 
most of the activists in the union movement were left-wingers and opponents their voices were 
quite influential. 
 
Danish EEC membership began simultaneously with the creation of the ETUC. The Danish LO was 
in favour of an ETUC which covered both members and non-members of the EEC in order “to 
prevent any split of the Nordic union movement between EEC members and others” (Dølvik 
1997:136). This solidarity with the colleagues from the other Nordic countries, which is also 
anchored institutionally for instance in Nordic industry federations, has been an inherent feature of 
the Danish trade unions‟ representation in the ETUC.  
 
All the three Danish union confederations, the LO, FTF and AC, are members of the ETUC. 
Further, individual unions and/or union cartels are members of the European industry federations. 
 
The Single Market and union re-orientation 
After the Danish entry into the EEC, the discussion went on between left-wingers fearing the 
consequences of membership, and trade union leaders reassuring that nothing substantial would be 
changed in Danish industrial relations. A more active trade union orientation only came about when 
the plans for the Single Market appeared in the mid 1980s. 
 
The massive liberalisations inherent in the plans for a Single Market made it clear to Danish union 
leaders that it was no longer sufficient to ignore the European developments and that union policies 
towards developments at the European level were necessary. At first they tried to fight the Single 
Market project by advocating a „no‟ in the referendum that took place in 1987, but in spite of 
opposition also from the Social-democratic Party, a majority of the Danish elctorate voted „yes‟. 
Explicitly turning against total harmonisations of rules the Danish unions advocated minimum 
standards to be implemented as a shield against the „social dumping‟ that was feared as a 
consequence of market liberalisations. One area where Danish unions were quite satisfied was 
health and safety where European directives, including the 1989 framework directive on worker 
participation in health and safety work, were seen as a sign that Community standards would not 
undercut Danish standards, at the same time as they would not require substantial changes in Danish 
rules.  
 
In principle, Danish unions – like the ETUC - supported the social dimension of the Single Market 
as formulated by the president of the Commission, Jacques Delors, and its concretisation in the so-
called social charter adopted by the Council of Ministers in 1989 and followed by a social action 
plan the year after (Knudsen 1995). The Danish union interest was formulated as a combination of 
two goals. The first one was to counter social dumping, and here directives – or, preferably, 
negotiated agreements between the parties at European level - defining European minimum 
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standards on different issues were seen as positive instruments. The other one was to avoid EU 
regulation in areas and ways that would imply changes in Danish industrial relations. Specific 
initiatives at the EU level could easily bring the two goals into conflict with each other, and when a 
series of directives aiming at implanting the social dimension were discussed during the 1990s it 
appeared that in most instances the goal of defending Danish institutions took priority over the goal 
of improving labour standards at the European level. This has been expressed quite bluntly by the 
president of the Metal Workers Federation (LO 2003, 16, our translation): 
 
”Our focus is that the development in the EU with directives and social dialogue is ok as long as it 
does not lead to anything that bothers us. I do not think this attitude is special for the metalworkers. 
I think it covers the Danish unions generally.” 
Scepticism towards EU directives 
Such an ethno-centric position was confirmed by a study by Torunn Olsen (1996) who compared 
German and Danish political processes, involving trade unions, employer organisations and 
governments, during the preparation of three European Union (EU) directives – on pregnant 
workers, employment contracts and working time respectively. Three conclusions can be drawn 
from her study. First, the policies of the Danish government were based on consensus positions 
reached between the most important national trade union and employer organisations. Second, the 
discussions on the substantial content of the directives weighed less than concerns over the expected 
disruptive impact of the directives on the Danish regulation system. Third, the Danish proposals 
during the negotiations were consistently aimed at minimising the directives‟ impact on the Danish 
regulation system, i.e. to reduce the content of general, binding and detailed employee rights in the 
directives (cf. also Larsen-Jensen and Bøgh 1996; Knudsen and Lind 2000). 
 
This line was continued for example during the discussions on the directives on information and 
consultation (adopted 2002) and agency work (adopted 2008). In both cases the consensusbased 
Danish position was that European regulation was a) not necessary, and b) could prove detrimental 
to domestic arrangements in Denmark. Concerning the information and consultation directive, the 
Danish „social partners‟ shared the opinion that the directive would be harmful to the Danish 
tradition of information and consultation through co-operation committees based on collective 
agreements. Together, they even asked  the Prime Minister to intervene on their behalf – which he 
did. The Danish position contributed to  delaying the process of adopting the directive as well as to 
watering down some of its provisions, especially by making it crystal clear in the text of the 
directive that existing collectively agreed structures for information and consultation may replace 
the structures provided for by the directive. Regarding the directive on agency work union views 
were more divided. The divisions seemed to be related to whether the unions, prior to the directive, 
had managed to get satisfactory solutions on agency work in their national agreements or not. While 
the union of the office workers welcomed the directive it was seen as unnecessary by unions in the 
manufacturing sector, a position they shared with the employers – a sign that the consensus between 
the Danish IR parties regarding EU regulation after all has its limits (Politiken, 23.10.2008). 
 
In relation to European Works Councils (EWCs) Danish unions recognised the importance and 
necessity of a directive as it is dealing with transnational issues. Danish unions were quite active in 
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helping to set up EWCs in the mid 1990s after the adoption of the EWC Directive. However, the 
unions have been hesitant to define a playing field for EWCs, and on several occasions they have 
warned against the possibility of EWCs becoming bargaining agents (Knudsen 2003). This view, 
and the beliefs behind it, notable a fear of losing members, is well described by the president of the 
Danish Metal Workers‟ Union (LO 2003, 19, our translation): 
 
“…it is incredibly important to explain to our members of European Works Councils that (these)… 
are bodies for consultation and information. They can look at general issues and maybe also 
personnel policies. But they must never become fora that enter into agreements at collective 
bargaining level or replace collective agreements…Some in the EMF would like to see the EWCs 
go further. But here we, together with our Nordic colleagues, maintain the view that if we entrust 
the EWCs with collective bargaining issues, then we will push our members away. Our shop 
stewards will so to speak get „our product‟ from the works council and thereby also from the 
company instead of getting it from the organisation to which they have their natural affiliation”.  
 
The EU-sceptical position of the Danish trade union movement has also been visible at ETUC 
congresses. Both in Helsinki (1999) and in Prague (2003) the Danish affiliates where sceptical to 
the recommendations from the congresses because EU legislation was seen as threatening the 
Danish system based on bi-partisan voluntarism. In Seville (2007) the Danish unions had very few 
suggestions for changes to the proposed action plan. A main reason for this was perhaps a careful 
phrasing of the proposed actions by the preparatory committees recommending both legislation and 
collective bargaining as ways which unions should further in order to achieve results  
 
Enlargement and Laval 
The inclusion of new EU member states in 2004 awoke new concerns among the trade unions on 
the risk of social dumping. Especially workers from Poland and the Baltic States were seen as a 
potential risk for Danish pay and working condition standards. The restrictions that were passed in 
the Danish Parliament (Folketinget) took off some of the pressures, but the unions wanted more 
control with the influx of labour.   The trade unions, in particular in the building sector, are still very 
much on the alert on the issue. It is difficult to control whether foreign companies operating in 
Denmark adhere to Danish pay and working conditions, especially when the key elements are to be 
found in collective agreements that include provisions from sector-level as well as local bargaining.  
 
A strong challenge to the voluntarist Danish system emerged from the European Court‟s Laval 
decision (C-341/05). Although the Court actually acknowledged the right to conflict in order to get 
a collective agreement, the decision was in favour of the Latvian employer operating in Sweden as 
the Court found that level of pay in the geographical area should be made more accessible and easy 
to find for the company (premise 110) as a precondition for respecting the regulation (the 
agreement). This was seen as a major defeat, also among Danish trade unions, and they shared the 
worries that ever since were expressed by the ETUC and affiliated unions. In 2008 a tripartite 
commission recommended the Danish Government to pass legislation which made it clear that the 
level of pay should be made transparent for the foreign company as a precondition for unions being 
allowed to take industrial action.  
 
The Danish Minister of Employment announced that the recommendations will be passed as 
legislation and that this would save the right to industrial conflict, but as the LO has stated, this may 
only be a solution for the immediate future. How the pay levels shall be made sufficiently 
transparent and be put into practice is still an open question (spring 2011) because most sector-level 
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collective agreements operate with so-called minimum pay systems which do not stipulate the 
normal or average pay level. In a longer perspective, however, the Danish unions agree with the 
ETUC that a more durable solution should be found. How this will be done is also unclear at 
present and there is considerable concern among trade unionists about the effects of EU regulation 
on Danish IR: together with the banning of closed shops in 2004 this case has reignited a lot of 
scepticism towards EU regulation. It is not popular that the ruling of EU lawyers can supersede 
national IR regulation.   
 
The Euro Pact 
When the European Commission in 2010 presented its Europe 2020 strategy as a follow up on the 
Lisbon strategy it was clear that nothing had changed in the basic trust in liberalist ideas on the 
healing forces of the market (European Commission 2010). The obvious problems that caused the 
so-called financial crisis since 2008 were not faced by this strategy apart from one remarkable 
thing: the bad boys of the classroom should have stricter rules and tougher sanctions. When the 
Merkel-Sarkozy initiative was launched early 2011 this became even more apparent: the Irish, 
Portuguese, Spanish and not least Greek malaise should not repeat itself in the future. The so-called 
Europlus Pact to be discussed and accepted by the Europeans in March 2011 included a lot of 
measures to improve competitiveness and co-ordination of the economic policy in the member 
states (economic governance). 
 
As a non-Euro country Denmark was not part of the original signing from 11 March but on the 
meeting 24-25 March Denmark signed together with other EU-countries. 
 
Already during 2010 the ETUC was sceptic to the 2020 strategy as it contained less focus on social 
and labour market issues than previous strategies. This scepticism escalated further during 2011 
when the Merkel-Sarkozy initiative flavoured the pact. At the ETUC Congress in Athens in May the 
main focus was on the mobilising for social Europe and the main criticism was that the Euro Plus 
Pact was focusing on austerity measures and not economic growth and more jobs. In the approved 
Strategy and Action Plan 2011-2014 it says: 
 
” The ETUC has been highly critical of the restrictive terms of “help” being made available to 
distressed member states. We have alleged that they are less a helping hand, and more a 
punishment. They risk killing growth and jobs in the countries concerned. They require cuts in 
public sector pay, minimum wages, public services, pension entitlements and unemployment 
benefits. They interfere with the autonomy of the social partners.” (ETUC 2011) 
 
While the ETUC fiercely maintained its opposition to the Europlus Pact, the path of the Danish LO 
(and FTF) was different. On 11 March the chairman of the LO said that  
 
“it is completely inacceptable if the EU intervenes in wages and violate the Danish tradition that 
workers and employers find the right level themselves. That is the reason why we clearly reject the 
pact.” (Politiken 2011) 
 
The FTF had exactly the same point of view (FTF 2011), but already 22 March the opinions of the 
two main organisations had completely changed. They now supported the pact. They both 
expressed their satisfaction with the pact and that they had now got guarantees that the EU would 
not intervene in wage setting in Denmark, as expressed by the chairman of the LO: 
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“I am satisfied that Denmark joins the Euro Pact with a broad political mandatet hat favours 
economic growth and employment in Europe. It is important that we stand together in Europe to get 
people back into employment.” (LO 2011) 
 
This U-turn may seem remarkable. The „guarantees‟ they have got for the non-intervention in the 
Danish labour market was that the political opposition in the Danish Folketing (the Social 
Democrats and the People‟s Socialist Party) at a meeting in the Parliamentary committee on Europe 
(Europaudvalget) had supported the Government‟s policy on the pact which among other things 
states that “the Pact builds upon national self-determination on the economic policy and respect for 
national labour market models”. (Folketinget 2011). 
 
It seems like the major concern of the LO and the FTF is the prevalence of the „Danish Model‟ and 
not so much a concern of being on line with the ETUC in its interpretation of the political contents 
of the pact. Consequently it may also occur that the Danish unions are less critical to the neo-
liberalist strategy than their European colleagues are, and that they have national priorities as their 
prime focus. 
 
The theory of EU as a threat to ‘the Danish model’ 
As has been shown, Danish union views on EU regulation in the industrial relations area have been 
quite sceptical. If we leave the Laval court ruling aside – this is a case that constitute a threat to all 
unions – and concentrate on how Danish unions have reacted to the directives coming from the EU 
– then how can their policy and behaviour be explained? In other words, which considerations, 
which theory, lie behind the policy?  
 
First of all, there is a strong belief in the blessings of the fundamentally voluntarist Danish system 
of industrial relations. Again we can listen to the metal worker president (LO 2003, 17-18, our 
translation): 
 
”We certainly prefer agreements to legislation. This goes for Denmark, and it goes for Europe. We 
think that what we have done in Denmark for many, many years, namely that the labour market 
parties are the ones who negotiate the conditions in the workplaces is what is most durable and 
binding. That is also why we are worried when we see colleagues asking for legislation in areas 
where they think things are progressing slowly or where they cannot get far enough with 
agreements. We believe it will be strainful, if not destructive, for the parties‟ possibilities to enter 
into agreements which they afterwards feel obliged by”.  
In Denmark there is strong support for this so-called Danish model characterised as mentioned 
earlier by a minimum of legislation and an emphasis on voluntary, collective bargaining as the way 
to resolve labour issues. Trade unions support the model because it gives them a strong position in 
the system, and because they believe that the roles they play in it secures a high affiliation rate. 
Employer organisations support it because it frees them from detailed, inflexible legislation for 
instance on employment protection, working time and minimum pay. Finally, politicians support it 
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because they believe it is the best way to avoid conflicts and because the parties are orientated 
towards growth and competitiveness and thus prepared to act in a ‟responsible‟ way. 
 
The quotation above expresses a widely held belief that ‟too much‟ legislation, irrespective of 
whether it comes from Copenhagen or Brussels, will threaten to disrupt the system by shifting the 
delicate balance it rests upon. Notably there is a perceived risk that the employers will pull back 
their support for the system and instead unilaterally pursue their stated aim of deregulation. The 
collective bargaining system is perceived as a quid pro quo system which is disturbed when one of 
the sides – in this case the workers – „gets something for nothing‟ through the legislative road. In 
particular, this view has been forwarded by the FTF and unions attached to the bargaining cartels 
(Sørensen 2000).  
 
The theory of the EU as a ‟threat to the Danish model‟ has not only thrived in the trade union 
movement, but also in the academic field. On the basis of their studies of the Danish collective 
bargaining system Jesper Due and Jørgen Steen Madsen in the early 1990s invented ‟the Danish 
model‟ as the concept that is now generally used to describe the Danish industrial relations system. 
They also formulated the theoretical expectation of EU regulation representing a threat to the 
Danish model. During the 1990s they seconded the trade union movement in its demand that EU 
directives should primarily be implemented in Denmark through collective agreements rather than 
legislation. If this could not be done the whole system would be at risk (Due et al 2000: 154): 
 
”The implications for the Danish model are real. If the requirement that all workers are to be 
covered by the political directives means excessive supplementary legislation, this will drastically 
alter the balance between collective agreements and legislation in the Danish model. This, in turn, 
will reduce the influence of the labour-market organisations, and the trade unions in particular risk 
losing members. Why join a union if you are already entitled to the rights via legislation?”  
Faced by a case at the European Court prepared by the European Commission, the Danish 
government in 2003 finally backed down from the position developed by the labour market parties 
and the government in the early 1990s, namely that implementation of EU directives could and 
should take place solely through collective agreements, at least in cases where this was deemed 
preferable by the parties. The problem with such an implementation procedure was of course its 
failure to guarantee the rights of the directives to employees not covered by collective agreements. 
The change in position implied that the typical method of implementation became a mixture of 
including the directives‟ provisions in collective agreements – for those workers that are covered – 
and supplementary legislation aiming at workers not covered by collective agreements. 
 
 
 
Towards a less ethnocentric position? 
The main thrust of the theory of EU as a threat remains intact. It is still the predominant view that 
EU regulation based on legislation – especially if it hits core collective bargaining areas - will have 
harmful effects on the Danish model. This view has had its stronghold in the FTF (Sørensen 2000) 
and among union officers and officials who are responsible for collective bargaining whereas the 
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LO as a peak organisation has shown more interest in developing proactive policies toward 
European integration. An LO publication from 2001 discussing collective agreements versus 
legislation simply stated, ”The Danish Model is not threatened” (LO 2001, 1) and argued for a more 
nuanced view on improvements in labour standards achieved through legislation. 
 
With a basis in the voluntarist Danish tradition the trade union movement after the century turn 
attempted to formulate a more offensive policy pointing at alternative methods of EU regulation. 
Since the late 1980s Danish unions have propagated negotiations between ETUC and UNICE (now 
Business Europe) as preferable to the legislative way. But only recently has this position been 
developed in a more realistic way that begins to take the employers‟ reluctance to negotiate at the 
European level into account. The 2003 LO Congress opted for connecting the wish for negotiations 
with demands for a framework agreement between ETUC and UNICE(now Business 
Europe)/CEEP – defining procedures for negotiations at the European level – as well as a European 
labour court with authority to rule in conflicts that have a transnational character. However, and 
contrary to the ETUC position, the Danish resolution explicitly refused to demand a right to strike 
at the European level. As long as this is not part of the package, it will be difficult to drag the 
employers to the European negotiation table. 
 
Thus, as far as orientations toward European integration are concerned, Danish unions‟ first priority 
remains the national corporatist system and good relations to the other parties in this system. The 
wishes to advance European industrial relations are held in check by this first priority, but they do 
exist When the Danish LO president congratulated the EC/EU with its 50
th
 anniversary in 2007 his 
assessment was a positive one: 
 
“European workers have also benefited from the co-operation. This, for instance, is true of the 
many minimum standards on occupational health and safety and employment relations and social 
rights which in a number of areas have also led to progress in Denmark” (23.03.2007, www.lo.dk, 
our translation). 
 
He also stressed that the EU has an important role to play in securing a global regulation aiming at 
fair conditions via-a-vis multinational companies and the global economy. 
It would perhaps be an exaggeration to claim that Danish trade unions have adopted a less 
ethnocentric position in EU matters. They are still sceptical to EU involvement in the regulation of 
the Danish labour market because they simply believe that things are better regulated in Denmark 
than elsewhere. Apart from the case on the Euro Plus Pact – where Danish unions not share the 
ETUC scepticism – it seems that the Danish unions during the past few years have become less in 
opposition to their European colleagues and sister organisations. One reason for this may  be that 
the ETUC has applied a much more flexible strategy to deal with European regulation with the 
result that Danish unions are much more relaxed when issues are discussed at European trade union 
level. Another reason is that since the end of the 2000s the progress of „social Europe‟ has virtually 
stopped; the process of extending and harmonising labour rights across the EU seems to have been 
halted. Therefore, the challenges to Danish unions at this front have to a large degree disappeared. 
The new challenges mainly come from the increased competition within European labour markets 
and European court rulings defining market freedoms vis-à-vis trade union rights. Danish unions are 
here in the same boat, so to speak, as unions in many other countries. 
 
 
Part III: Conclusions and prospects 
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Skal vi ikke udelade dette afsnit? Det er meget en gentagelse i forhold til det foregående? Og 
så lidt en opsummering, behøves den? Kan noget måske indgå i en indledning? Jeg synes det 
er udmærket. Dele af det kan bruges som abstract også. Hvis det bliver til en rigtig artikel, 
ikke? 
When Denmark joined the EEC in 1973 the trade unions were divided in their attitudes to Europe. 
Although the trade union main organisation, the Danish LO, recommended to vote „yes‟ many of its 
member unions were against. The ensuing reluctance to engage in industrial relations at the 
European level has been a lasting result of this division, although scepticism was accompanied by 
active policy formulations from the mid 1980s when the Single Market and its social dimension 
came on the agenda. Still, national corporatist arrangements took priority over an interest in a 
Europeanisation of industrial relations – so much more as the latter was conceived as a threat to the 
former as was the case regarding several IR directives and, more recently, certainly in the Laval 
case and presumably the Euro Plus Pact.    
 
A main reason for members‟ and some trade unions‟ scepticism has been ethnocentrism rooted in 
the insecurities which could follow from the European integration process. „Social dumping‟ was 
seen as a threat to Danish labour standards and more generally the welfare system. Levelling out the 
standards in Europe would simply lower Danish standards, it was expected. These attitudes are still 
there but are taking other forms. Perhaps the reason for a much more relaxed attitude among Danish 
unions is that they now have got a more trustful relationship to their European sister organisations 
because of the much softer strategies of the ETUC. European trade unions are not only demanding 
legislation, but also want more space for collective bargaining. So the Danish unions can focus on 
fighting against EU statutory regulation (and the Court) and get understanding and support from 
other trade unions regarding the importance of collective bargaining.  
 
At the end of the day the issues are the same, namely social dumping and the preservation of the 
voluntarist model. The recent inclusion of the new member states from Eastern and Central Europe 
has sparked a concern that poor workers would invade the Danish labour market and press down 
regulatory standards, and recent decisions from the European Court of Justice have revitalised the 
fears from the 1990s stemming from the many directives that European regulation eventually shall 
ruin the „Danish Model‟, and eventually weaken the trade unions because they will lose a lot of 
members who cannot see any reason for joining a union when legislation or the lawyers have the 
main power.  
 
On this background some conclusions can be drawn: Firstly, Danish trade unions have been and to 
some extent still are reluctant to European integration. But seen in the perspective of the relatively 
strong minority of unions opposed to membership in 1973, the present scepticism is much weaker. 
Most unions consider the overall monetarist macroeconomic strategy as successful since the mid-
1990s, but there still exists widespread scepticism to EU regulation of a specific character (i.e. 
directives), mainly because it challenges national regulation based upon collective bargaining.  
 
Secondly, the overall trend of increasing European integration – via changes in the Treaty – has 
stimulated the Europeanisation of Danish trade unions in the sense that unions have become much 
more aware of the European agenda and gradually adjusted to it. Especially the single market 
campaign in the late 1980s and the subsequent Maastricht Treaty gradually convinced the unions 
that they could benefit from the economic and monetary integration, and the programme for the 
social dimension calmed them somewhat down in their anxiety of social dumping. The employment 
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growth that took off from the mid-1990s in Denmark underpinned the belief that membership of the 
the EU was a good overall political and economic framework. 
 
The political dimension, however, has always been less important to the unions. Danish unions have 
not turned more European because of expectations for good and better regulation of the labour 
market from the EU. Perhaps even the opposite because the ethnocentrism and the belief that the 
„Danish Model‟ is an optimal system of labour market regulation is a widespread feature of trade 
union attitudes. 
 
Thirdly, a main reason why Danish unions have reduced their internal footdragging strategies in the 
ETUC may be that ETUC strategies increasingly comprehend both legislation and collective 
bargaining. This gives room for preserving Danish voluntarism and may have paved the road for 
further and closer co-operation with European sister organisations. But so far Danish unions have 
not been pushing strongly for European regulation. They are rather passive supporters of the ETUC 
policies for more social regulation, and are keen supporters of the ETUC criticism of the European 
Court‟s violation of trade union rights. The interpretation among union leaders in Denmark is that 
they have not changed policies or strategies, but the ETUC has. This interpretation of convergence 
also goes concerning EU labour market policies as witnessed by the discourse on flexicurity. It is 
not the Danes who have converged to EU policies, rather it is the opposite: the EU has adopted 
Danish policies. 
 
The future prospects for trade union attitudes and behaviour to the EU are difficult to foresee. The 
prosperous days of the monetarist regime may be history now with the emerging crisis (autumn 
2008). Will this give room for another and less market-oriented strategy for economic and 
employment growth which may be more attractive for trade unions? Or will financial uncertainty 
and growing unemployment figures result in more protectionism and/or tougher competition 
between the nation states which will give unions even harder times in future? Or will the future 
bring new life to European unity and political and regulatory convergence? 
 
There are no signs of Danish unions abandoning their belief in the voluntarist system of labour 
market regulation, but the pragmatism of at least the past 10 years or so, which have taught the 
Danish unions to live with EU legislation and perhaps to realise that this may not harm union 
interest representation, may be continued. If the ETUC continues its present openness and its 
differentiated strategy allowing for both legislation and collective bargaining, Danish – and Nordic - 
unions will maintain and probably further develop their constructive attitude to the European sister 
organisations.  
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